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CHALLENGING THE DISCRETIONARY ASPECTS OF A SENTENCE IN
PENNSYLVANIA: COMMONWEALTH V M4STROMARINO
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT - The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
that: (1) Mastromarino failed to raise a substantial question as to why the consecutive nature of
his aggregate sentence was contrary to the Sentencing Code; (2) Mastromarino did raise a
substantial question that the disparity between his sentence and that of his co-defendants was
contrary to the Sentencing Code; and (3) the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion and
amply explained the reasons for the disparity between Mastromarino's sentence and the co-
defendants' sentences.
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I. THE MASTROMARINO DECISION
In 2002, Michael Mastromarino ("Mastromarino") founded a business which sold tissue
harvested from cadavers to tissue banks throughout the United States.' He began harvesting
tissue without permission from the deceased, or the deceased's next of kin, at funeral homes in
New York and New Jersey.2 He would then reassemble the cadaver using artificial materials so
as to conceal the harvesting. 3
In 2004, Mastromarino entered into an arrangement with Liberty Crematory ("Liberty")
located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.4  Mastromarino paid Liberty $1000 per cadaver from
1. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 583 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). In 2002, after his dental
license was taken away due to unconnected criminal charges, Mastromarino began a business called Biomedical
Tissue Service ("BTS"). Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 583. BTS sold human tissue from corpses to tissue banks
throughout the United States. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. For example, Mastromarino would reconstruct cadavers using PVC pipe. Id.
4. Id. The owners of Liberty Crematory were Louis Garzone, James McCafferty and Gerald
Garzone. Id.
1
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which tissue was to be harvested.5 Additionally, he forged consent forms, medical history forms,
and identity forms in order to give the illusion of conformity with tissue industry standards. 6
Mastromarino also altered blood samples and blood sample labels, thus falsely depicting that the
tissue was tested and infectionless. 7
In July 2005, the State of New York and the United States Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") began an investigation into Mastromarino's affairs. Mastromarino continued to
conduct business with Liberty during this time.9 In September 2005, he destroyed his company's
records and tried to convince Liberty to burn down its entire business.10  In the end,
Mastromarino harvested and sold tissue from 244 cadavers supplied by Liberty."
On August 29, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Mastromarino pled guilty to 1,353 separate counts.12 The charges against him included corrupt
organization, conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking, deceptive business practices, and abuse of a
corpse. 13 On October 22, 2008, the sentencing court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-
five to fifty-eight years in prison. 14 This sentence was to run concurrently with the eighteen to
forty-four year prison sentence that he was currently serving in New York.15  The sentencing
5. Id In lieu of reassembling the cadavers, Mastromarino wanted to bum the cadavers after
harvesting, so he tried to find a funeral director with a crematory. Id.
6. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 583.
7. Id It was later revealed that some of the tissue was infected with H.I.V. and hepatitis. Id.
Additionally, tissue was harvested from cadavers outside the industry's recommended time period after death. Id.
Doctors unknowingly transplanted the diseased and unsuitable tissues into patients. Id.
8. Id. at 583-84.
9. Id. at 584.
10. Id. Liberty Crematory was not burned down. Id
I1. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 584. Neither Mastromarino, nor Liberty ever received consent to harvest
the tissue from the 244 cadavers. Id. Liberty received $245,000 from Mastromarino for providing cadavers for
tissue harvesting and its subsequent destruction of the cadavers. Id. Mastromarino received $1,105,751 from
unaware tissue banks to which the stolen tissue was sold. Id.
12. Id On May 4, 2006, Mastromarino was arrested after the Grand Jury advised that charges be
filed. Id.
13. Id at 583.
14. Id at 584.
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court's combined sentence was as follows: one count of corrupt organization,16 adding one to six
years; one count of criminal conspiracy, adding one to six years; six to twelve months for two
hundred forty-four counts of theft by unlawful taking with thirty-two counts to run
consecutively, adding sixteen to thirty-two years; six to twelve months for four counts of
deceptive business practices with all four counts to run consecutively, adding two to four years;
and six to twelve months for seventeen counts of abuse of a corpse with fifteen of the counts to
run consecutively, adding five to ten years.' 7 Mastromarino appealed to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence.18
The issue before the superior court was whether the sentencing court abused its
sentencing discretion based on: (1) the consecutive nature of the sentencing court's aggregate
sentence;1 9 and (2) the purported disparity between Mastromarino's sentence and that of his co-
defendants. 20 As there is no automatic entitlement to an appeal with respect to the discretionary
component of sentencing, the appellate court began by applying a four-part analysis to each of
the two issues raised in Mastromarino's petition in order to determine if the appeal was
warranted.21 The court concluded the first issue-the consecutive nature of the aggregate
16. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (West 2010).
17. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 584-85. Mastromarino forfeited $300,000 to New York for restitution
and Pennsylvania sought no further restitution for the crimes. Id. at 585.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 589. Mastromarino and the Garzone brothers were sentenced by the same judge and at the
same sentencing hearing. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 589. Mastromarino, however, received a longer sentence than
his co-defendants. Id
21. Id. at 585. The four-part analysis consists of:
(1) whether appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant's brief has a
fatal defect; and (4) whether a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)). The Commonwealth contended that
Mastromarino's brief did not conform with Pa. R. App. P. 2119(f), which requires "an appellant who challenges the
discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons
relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence." (see Pa. R. App. P.
2119(f) (West 2010)). Id. at 586. The appellate court granted Mastromarino's motion to amend his brief. Id.
51 Vol. 2:2
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sentence-did not pass the four-part test, because it did not raise a substantial question in
opposition to the Sentencing Code.22 Conversely, the court concluded the second issue-the
disparity between the sentences of the co-defendants-did raise a substantial question and
warranted review.23 On review, the court analyzed the rationale behind the sentence disparity
and whether the sentencing court properly conveyed its rationale to each defendant. 24 Based on
its analysis of the record, the appellate court determined that the second issue on appeal was
without merit because the sentencing court adequately outlined and explained its reasons to each
defendant. 25 Ultimately, the appellate court held that the sentencing court had not abused its
-26
sentencing discretion.
II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE MASTROAL4RINO DECISION
A petitioner is not automatically entitled to an appeal when he challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence.27 Commonwealth v. Anderson makes it clear that a
sentence will not be reversed on appeal unless the sentencing court abused its discretion.28
22. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 589. The appellate court concluded the sentence was neither "grossly
disparate to Mastromarino's conduct, nor did it 'viscerally appear as patently unreasonable."' Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)).
23. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Krysiak, 535 A.2d 165, 167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
24. Id. at 589-91. Using the sentencing court's record, the appellate court examined whether the
sentencing court provided particular reasons to each defendant explaining why they received their individual
sentences. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 589.
25. Id. at 589, 591. The appellate court determined that the sentencing court provided each defendant
with a sufficient explanation as to the particular reasons why each received their individual sentence. Id. at 589.
The appellate court evidenced those reasons by citing the sentencing court's record throughout its opinion. Id at
589-91. For example, the sentencing court labeled Mastromarino as the "architect of a scheme that most of us can't
contemplate." Id.
26. Id. at 591. The court affirmed the sentence imposed by the sentencing court. Id.
27. Cook, 941 A.2d at 7, 11 (citing Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 611 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2005)). Cook challenged the discretionary aspect of his sentence. Id. Cook pled guilty to two counts of driving
under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). Id. at 10. He challenged the prior record score used in determining his
sentence. Id. at 11. The court used Cook's past DUI convictions in calculating his prior record score. Id. Cook
claimed that the court erred in its calculation. Cook, 941 A.2d at 11.
28. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
52 Vol. 2:2
4
Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://ddc.duq.edu/dclj/vol2/iss2/8
Commonwealth v. Mastromarino
Therefore, any challenge is more aptly termed a petition for allowance of appeal.29  In
Commonwealth v. Cook, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania established a four-part test used in
determining when to grant said allowance. 30 The court examines whether: (1) the notice of
appeal was filed on time; 31 (2) the issue was preserved during sentencing or in a post-sentence
motion;32 (3) the brief contains the required statement explaining the grounds for an allowance of
appeal; 33 and (4) a substantial question exists that the sentence was not proper under the
Sentencing Code.34
In 1995, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Hoag addressed the
fourth prong of the Cook test when it considered whether a court's imposition of consecutive
rather than concurrent sentences created a substantial question.35 The court held that it did not.36
29. Cook, 941 A.2d at 11 (see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 9781(b) (West 2010)). In allowance of
appeal,
the defendant or the Commonwealth may file a petition for allowance of appeal of the
discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor to the appellate court that has
initial jurisdiction for such appeals. Allowance of appeal may be granted at the discretion of the
appellate court where it appears that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not
appropriate under this chapter.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 978 1(b).
30. Cook, 941 A.2d at 11 (citing Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1016).
31. Id. (see Pa. R. App. P. 902, 903(a) (West 2010)). The Rule requires "filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the lower court." Pa. R. App. P. 902. The notice of appeal must be filed "within 30 days after entry
of the order from which the appeal is taken." Pa. R. App. P. 903(a).
32. Id. (see Pa. R. Crim. P. 720(B)(1)(c), (B)(1)(a)(v) (West 2010)).
33. Id. (see Pa. R. App. P. 2119(f)). The rule states, "An appellant who challenges the discretionary
aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence." Pa. R. App. P. 2119(f)). The court
stated, "At a minimum, the . . . statement must articulate what particular provisions of the code is violated, what
fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the manner in which it violates the norm." Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at
586-87 (citing Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 826 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008); and Commonwealth v.
Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)).
34. Cook, 941 A.2d at 11. The court stated, "A substantial question will be found where an appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." Mastromarino, 2
A.3d at 585-86. (citing Bullock 948 A.2d at 826 n.6; Feucht, 955 A.2d at 383-384; and Commonwealth v. Horaman,
920 A.2d. 1282, 1284 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)).
35. Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). Hoag was convicted and
sentenced for drug-related offenses. Hoag, 665 A.2d at 1214. The court saw "no reason why Hoag should be
afforded a 'volume discount' for his crimes by having all sentences run concurrently." Id. (citing Commonwealth v.
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Fifteen years later, the Pennsylvania Superior Court once again examined this issue in
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus.37 Gonzalez-Dejusus claimed that he should have been
given concurrent sentences, because his various crimes arose out of one unbroken spree.3 The
court reaffirmed its holding in Hoag when it concluded that Gonzalez-Dejusus' claim did not
39 4
raise a substantial question. Citing Commonwealth v. Marts,40 the court reiterated that a
substantial question is not generally raised by the imposition of consecutive sentences versus
concurrent sentences.41 In Commonwealth v. Graham, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
clarified that courts have discretion to impose confinement sentences concurrently or
consecutively pursuant to section 9721(a) of the Sentencing Code. 42 In Pennsylvania, this has
been a long-standing rule, and any challenges to its exercise generally will not raise a substantial
question. 43
37. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598.
38. Id. at 598-99. Based on crimes that occurred over the course of a single day, Gonzalez-Dejusus
was sentenced consecutively with "two counts of kidnapping to facilitate a felony, two counts of robbery-
threatening serious injury, one count of robbery of a motor vehicle, two counts of recklessly endangering another
person, and two counts of criminal conspiracy." Id. at 597.
39. Id at 599. The court stated that "appellant appears to seek a 'volume discount' because the
various crimes occurred in one continuous spree. This is simply not a challenge . . . raising a substantial question."
Id (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)).
40. Marts, 889 A.2d 608. Marts claimed that the sentencing court erred when it imposed consecutive,
rather than concurrent, sentences on two of his four robberies. Id at 612.
41. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d at 598 (but see Commonwealth v. Dodge, 859 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004)).
42. Commonwealth v. Graham, 661 A.2d 1367, 1373 (Pa. 1995). Graham was sentenced to death on
six murder convictions and life imprisonment on a seventh conviction. Graham, 661 A.2d at 1371. The death
sentence was to run consecutively with the life imprisonment. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated
sentence of life imprisonment imposed for the seventh murder conviction. Id. at 1374. The court held that a death
sentence could not be imposed consecutively to other sentences. Id. Section 9721(a) states:
In determining the sentence to be imposed the court shall ... consider and select one or more of
the following alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or concurrently: (1) An order of
probation; (2) A determination of guilt without further penalty; (3) Partial confinement; (4) Total
confinement; (5) A fine; (6) County intermediate punishment; (7) State intermediate punishment.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 972 1(a)(l)-(7) (West 2010).
43. Hoag, 665 A.2d at 1214.
54 Vol. 2:2
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An exception to this general rule can be found in Commonwealth v. Dodge ("Dodge I").44
Defendant Dodge challenged the extreme nature of his sentence due to the imposition of
consecutive sentences. 45 He was convicted on multiple counts of receiving stolen property, two
counts of burglary, criminal trespass, possession of a small amount of marijuana, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. 46 Dodge ultimately received a total
sentence of 58 1/2 to 124 years.47
The Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that Dodge's challenge did raise a
substantial question.48 The court clarified that in no way did its determination establish a new
general rule encompassing all challenges to consecutive sentences.49 It explained that each case
is unique, and sentence challenges will be explored on a case-by-case basis.50 Here, the court
compared Dodge's crimes to the sentence he received,5 determining that the consecutive aspect
of Dodge's combined sentence made it extreme, and therefore, patently unreasonable. 52  The
sentence was vacated and the matter was remanded back to the sentencing court.53 However,
prior to remand, the issue was presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for consideration. 54
The supreme court vacated the superior court's order, and remanded the case for review
consistent with its recent decision in Commonwealth v. Walls.
44. Dodge, 859 A.2d 771.
45. Id. at 776.
46. Id. at 773.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Dodge, 859 A.2d at 782.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 781, 782, 784. The crimes committed were "all property crimes, many of which involved
property of little value." Id. at 781. There were no "crimes against a person, and the two burglary convictions
involved no violence involving a person." Id.
52. Id. at 782, 784.
53. Id. at 784.
54. Commonwealth v. Dodge, 935 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 2007).
55. Dodge, 935 A.2d at 1291 (see Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007)). Walls
molested his seven-year-old granddaughter. Walls, 926 A.2d at 959. He "pled guilty to one count of rape of a
victim less than thirteen-years-old; one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse ("IDSI") with a victim less
55 Vol. 2:2
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In Walls, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the superior court exceeded its
standard of review when it made its own legal conclusions and vacated the sentence issued by
the sentencing court.56 The court claimed that section 9781 (c)(3) of the Sentencing Code clearly
states that an appellate court may vacate and remand a sentence if the sentence was outside of the
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") and is unreasonable.57  In its review to determine
unreasonableness, the appellate court must apply the factors set forth in section 9781(d).
On remand, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reconsidered Dodge ("Dodge Il") in light
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Walls. 59 The court made a clear distinction
between Walls and Dodge 11.60 Whereas the sentence in Walls was outside the Guidelines, the
sentence in Dodge II was within the Guidelines. 61 Therefore, the clearly unreasonable standard
of section 9781(c)(2) applies, not the unreasonable standard of section 9781(c)(3) from Walls.62
than thirteen-years-old, and one count of incest." Id. Walls received the consecutive maximum sentences for the
rape and IDSI, which were outside the standard ranges of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 960. The sentencing
court considered: "(1) Walls' position of trust; (2) the age of the victim; (3) Walls' relationship to the victim; and (4)
Walls believed his conduct was accidental, not deliberate." Id.
56. Walls, 926 A.2d at 968. The Pennsylvania Superior Court claimed that sentences should be based
on: "(1) minimum confinement consistent with the gravity of the offense; (2) the need for public protection; and (3)
the defendant's need for rehabilitation." Id at 960. Additionally, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania concluded that
"the sentencing court must, if it imposes a sentence that deviates significantly from the guideline recommendation,
demonstrate that the case is compellingly different from the typical case of the same offense." Id. The superior court
concluded that the sentencing court "is not free to reject the Sentencing Commission's assessment of an appropriate
sentence and simply interpose its own sense of punishment." Id.
57. Id at 963. Per 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(c)(3) (West 2010), "the appellate court shall
vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds: the sentencing court
sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable." Id.
58. Id. Pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(d) (West 2010), the appellate shall consider the
following when determining unreasonableness:
1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any pre-sentence
investigation. 3) The findings upon which the sentence was based. 4) The guidelines promulgated
by the commission.
Walls, 926 A.2d at 963. Based on common usage, the court defined unreasonable as "irrational or not guided by
sound judgment." Id
59. Commonwealth v. Dodge, 957 A.2d 1198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
60. Dodge, 957 A.2d. at 1200 n.3.
61. Id
62. Id. Section 9781(c)(2) states, "the appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to
the sentencing court with instructions if it finds: the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but
56 Vol. 2:2
8
Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://ddc.duq.edu/dclj/vol2/iss2/8
57 Commonwealth v. Mastromarino Vol. 2:2
Ultimately, the court reached the same conclusion as it did in Dodge I.63 The superior court
reasoned that the sentence, although within the Guidelines, was excessive and patently
unreasonable. 64
Historically, a challenge to the imposition of concurrent confinement sentences
generally will not raise a substantial question.65 The court may, however, find that a substantial
question is raised where the appellant avers that his sentence is inconsistent with that of his co-
defendant/s. 66 In Commonwealth v. Cleveland, the court determined that a substantial question
was raised when the appellant's sentence was two and half times larger than his co-defendant. 67
A substantial question was also raised in Commonwealth v. Krysiak, where the appellant
challenged his dissimilar sentence when compared to that of his co-defendant for conviction of
the same crimes.68 However, in Pennsylvania, there has never been a mandate requiring co-
defendants to receive the same sentence.69 Additionally, sentence differences are allowable and
will not be disturbed if the record reflects adequate reasons for said differences. 70
the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable." 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(c)(2) (West 2010).
63. Dodge, 957 A.2d. at 1202. The court vacated and remanded the matter back to the lower court.
Id.
64. Id. The court felt that the total sentence for "non-violent offenses with limited financial impact"
was excessive and an abuse of discretion. Id. Based Dodge's age, the court considered the imposed sentence to be a
life sentence. Id.
65. Hoag, 665 A.2d at 1214; and Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d at 599.
66. Commonwealth v. Cleveland, 703 A.2d 1046, 1048 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
67. Cleveland, 703 A.2d at 1048. Cleveland was the driver of a vehicle involved in a drive-by
shooting, and was convicted of conspiracy, carrying of firearms on a public street, and aggravated assault. Id at
1047. Cleveland was sentenced to 25-50 years in prison. Id.
68. Krysiak, 535 A.2d at 167. Krysiak and his co-defendant were sentenced by different judges from
the same court. Id at 166. Krysiak plead guilty and was sentenced to ten to twenty years of imprisonment for
robbery, five to ten consecutive years for criminal conspiracy, and two and a half to five consecutive years for
possessing instruments of a crime. Id. Krysiak's co-defendant was sentenced to four to eight years of imprisonment
for robbery, and four consecutive years of probation for criminal conspiracy. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 166. In Cleveland, the record reflected the reasons for the difference in sentence.
Cleveland, 703 A.2d at 1048. Cleveland was found to be indifferent to past rehab, exhibited no remorse, and used
drugs and alcohol. Id In Krysiak, the court concluded that the record reflected ample reasons, such as, a past felony
record. Krysiak, 535 A.2d at 167.
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MASTROMARINO DECISION
In 1974, the Pennsylvania General Assembly ("Assembly") passed a detailed Sentencing
Code for trial judges to use in determining sentences.71 In 1978, the Pennsylvania Commission
on Sentencing ("Commission") was created to establish the Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines").72 The purpose of the Guidelines was to end sentencing disparity and create
sentencing consistency. 73  In 1982, the Assembly approved the Guidelines created by the
Commission. 74  However, in 1987, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Sessoms declared the Guidelines to have no force at all.75 In response, the
Assembly and Commission created the current Guidelines.76 In spite of this, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania's decision in Commonwealth v. Walls reaffirmed that the Guidelines were not
binding and do not predominate over other sentencing considerations.77
As such, an appellate court will rarely disturb a sentence absent an abuse of discretion78
because the sentencing court observes the defendant and is aware of his or her past criminal
conduct.79 For this reason, it may behoove an uncertain defendant to take a plea bargain, as he or
71. Joseph A. De Sole, Appellate Review in a Sentencing Guidelines Jurisdiction: The Pennsylvania




74. Id. at 490. Pennsylvania was one of the first states to utilize guidelines in sentencing. See Kevin
R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1141, 1443 (1997).
75. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 782 (Pa. 1987). The Court determined that the
legislative process was violated when a resolution was never presented to the Governor for approval during the
passage of the Guidelines. Id.
76. De Sole, supra note 71, at 491 (see Sentencing Guidelines, 204 PA. CODE § 303 (2010)).
77. Walls, 926 A.2d at 964-65.
78. Id. at 961. Pennsylvania has a low interference with trial court sentences. Reitz, supra note 74, at
1497.
79. De Sole, supra note 71, at 493.
58 Vol. 2:2
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she will most likely be bound by an imposed sentence. However, the Guidelines do not
encourage guilty pleas because there is no built-in sentence reduction for doing so.so
Additionally, a defendant in Pennsylvania does not have a right to challenge the
discretionary aspects of his or her felony or misdemeanor sentence. Rather, the defendant
requests an allowance from the appellate court. The appellate court will determine on a case-by-
case basis if a substantial question has been raised; it will evaluate whether the appellant's
sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. ' Finally, Appellate Procedure Rule
2119(f) requires that the appellant's brief contain a concise statement as to why an allowance
should be granted by the appellate court.82 The rules of appellate procedure clearly permit an
appellate court to limit review based on the procedural missteps of the defendant.
Although Mastromarino's appellate brief failed to express an adequate 2119(f) statement,
the court granted his allowance of appeal. 83 Perhaps there is a rationale behind the court's
decision to grant Mastromarino this allowance. In the interest of judicial economy,84 it may be
prudent to grant an allowance of appeal or leave to amend a brief due to an inadequate 2119(f)
statement. If the appeal is denied due to a defective 2119(f) statement, the appellant may have
direct appeal rights under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").ss If a
defendant is convicted of a crime and serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole
for that crime, relief may be sought under the PCRA when the conviction or sentence resulted
80. John H. Kramer & Jeffery T. Ulmer, Sentencing Guidelines: Lessons from Pennsylvania 139
(Lynne Rienner Publishers) (2009).
81. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(b).
82. See Pa. R. App. P. 2119(f).
83. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 586, n.4. The Commonwealth claimed that Mastromarino's 2119(f)
statement, "(1) failed to describe what the guidelines were or where Mastromarino's sentence falls in relation to
those guidelines; and (2) does not specify what fundamental norm was violated or the manner of the violation." Id.
84. Judicial economy is the "efficiency in the operation of the courts and the judicial system; esp., the
efficient management of litigation so as to minimize duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary's time
and resources." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 863 (8th ed. 2004).
85. Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9541 et seq. (West 2010).
The PCRA "provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving
illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9542 (West 2010).
59 Vol. 2:2
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from ineffective assistance from counsel.86 If an allowance of appeal is denied due to an
inadequate 2119(f) statement, a defendant could argue that his sentence resulted from the
ineffectiveness of his counsel to articulate an adequate 2119(f) statement. Hence, an allowance
that was denied by the appellate court for procedural reasons may later come before that same
court in the form of relief under the PCRA. Therefore, the appellate court should focus more on
the substantive matter of the appellant's brief, rather than the procedural requirement of a
2119(f) statement. It seems that the true question is whether an appellant raises a substantial
question in his brief-whether the appellant's sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing
Code.
In Mastromarino, the court discovered said substantial question within the argument
section of Mastromarino's brief, where he claimed a disparity between his sentence and that of
his co-defendants. Because a purpose of the Guidelines was to end sentence disparity, it makes
sense that an appellate court would consider Mastromarino's claim to raise a substantial
question. However, if the sentencing court explains the reasons for the disparity, as it did in
Mastromarino, the appellate court will uphold the sentencing court's decision.
The Sentencing Code clearly states that a sentence may be imposed either consecutively
or concurrently.8 As a result, a challenge to the consecutive nature of a sentence will most
likely not raise a substantial question based on the clear authorization within the Sentencing
Code. Mastromarino is consistent with precedent in finding that a substantial question will
86. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543 (West 2010).
87. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 590. The sentencing court considered Mastromarino to be the
mastermind or architect behind the crimes. Id.
88. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721(a).
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rarely be raised by a mere claim that the imposition of consecutive confinement sentences is
excessive under the Code. 89
An attorney should be sure to thoroughly research appellate cases that involve a
substantial question, and should likewise be careful to review the appropriate rules of appellate
procedure. Comparable cases should be incorporated into the client's 2119(f) statement and the
argument section of the brief. A misstep or omission could preclude appellate review and prove
extremely costly to a defendant.
Edward T Pollock
89. See Hoag, 665 A.2d at 1214; Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d at 599; and Marts, 889 A.2d 608.
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